@thednp/shorty
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Standard bundled/minified ESM output with source maps; not obfuscated. Stable pattern for this build tool package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript declaration file; long lines from concatenation, not obfuscation. Stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.14 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.0.13 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.0.12 | 0 / 12 | |
| 2.0.11 | 0 / 10 |
v2.0.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.13
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.