@teambit/component-tree
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@teambit/harmony | AI (dependencies): First-party teambit dependency; stable across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Bit.dev monorepo component packages routinely omit descriptions; stable pattern across thousands of versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): teambit publishes thousands of packages without provenance; consistent across the ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 407)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.613 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.612 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.611 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.610 | 3 / 2 |
v1.0.613
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.612
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.611
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.610
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.