@syncfusion/ej2-gantt
Essential JS 2 Gantt Component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-lists | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires on indirect usage patterns common in Syncfusion component bundles. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@syncfusion/ej2-notifications | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; same rationale as ej2-lists phantom-dep false positive. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Syncfusion component READMEs consistently contain many URLs and promotional content; not indicative of spam or phishing. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.12 | 15 / 0 | |
| 33.2.6 | 15 / 0 | |
| 33.2.3 | 15 / 0 | |
| 33.1.47 | 15 / 0 |
v33.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v33.1.47
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.