@swc/css-linux-arm64-musl
1
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
No SLSA provenance
npm registry signatures
gitHead linked
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
kdy1
Keywords
swcswcpackbabeltypescriptrustwebpacktsc
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): SWC platform-specific native binding; .node file is the intended deliverable for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary shim packages legitimately have no deps and minimal READMEs. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.28 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.28
2 findings
HIGH
Bundled binary files (1)
npm-metadata
Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • css.linux-arm64-musl.node
LOW
No provenance attestation
provenance
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.