@sveltejs/acorn-typescript
Acorn plugin that parses TypeScript
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:test262 | AI (npm-metadata): DevDep pointing to official TC39 test262 repo with SHA pin; standard for JS parser projects. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Normal Svelte team roster change; package has SLSA provenance and is published via GitHub Actions. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.10 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.9 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.8 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.7 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.6 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.5 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.4 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 11 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 10 |
v1.0.10
2 findingsDependency 'test262' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/tc39/test262.git#88ebb1e3755198cd08757bca1698effbbf360345' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.