@spinajs/tasks
SpinaJS tasks module
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spinajs/log | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic fires spuriously for re-exported transitive deps in monorepos. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 106)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.368 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.367 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.363 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.362 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.361 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.360 | 5 / 1 |
v2.0.368
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.367
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.363
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.362
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.361
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.360
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.