@spinajs/rbac
Role and Attribute based Access Control for SpinaJS framework
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:accesscontrol | AI (dependencies): accesscontrol is a standard RBAC library; expected dependency for this package across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:entropy-string | AI (dependencies): entropy-string is a well-known utility; stable legitimate dependency for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Publisher has 206 approved packages in same org scope; no suspicious changes in this version. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established spinajs monorepo package; no provenance is consistent across all its versions. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:react | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @spinajs/rbac is an RBAC module; Levenshtein match to 'react' is a false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spinajs/reflection | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 108)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.370 | 16 / 3 | |
| 2.0.369 | 16 / 3 | |
| 2.0.368 | 16 / 3 | |
| 2.0.367 | 16 / 3 | |
| 2.0.363 | 16 / 3 | |
| 2.0.362 | 16 / 3 | |
| 2.0.361 | 16 / 3 | |
| 2.0.360 | 16 / 3 |
v2.0.370
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.369
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.368
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.367
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.363
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.362
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.361
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.360
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.