@spinajs/rbac-http-user
HTTP API for basic user tasks ( login, logout, managing user account etc )
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Entire spinajs monorepo publishes without provenance; stable pattern across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 106)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.368 | 11 / 1 | |
| 2.0.367 | 11 / 1 | |
| 2.0.363 | 11 / 1 | |
| 2.0.362 | 11 / 1 | |
| 2.0.361 | 11 / 1 | |
| 2.0.360 | 11 / 1 |
v2.0.368
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.367
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.363
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.362
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.361
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.360
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.