@spark-web/combobox
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@spark-web/text-input | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for this monorepo package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.1.0 | 10 / 4 | |
| 6.0.0 | 10 / 4 | |
| 5.3.2 | 10 / 4 | |
| 5.3.0 | 10 / 4 | |
| 5.2.1 | 10 / 4 | |
| 5.2.0 | 10 / 4 | |
| 5.1.0 | 10 / 4 |
v6.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (brighte) than the most recent previously approved version (brighte-release-bot) on 2026-06-09, but brighte is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.