@sindresorhus/is
Type check values
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): False positive: @sindresorhus/is is a well-known scoped package by Sindre Sorhus. Edit-distance comparison to 'qs' is meaningless for scoped packages. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): False positive: @sindresorhus/is is a well-known scoped package by Sindre Sorhus. Edit-distance comparison to 'pg' is meaningless for scoped packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Sindre Sorhus is a highly trusted publisher with 174 packages; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.1.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 8.0.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 7.2.0 | 0 / 14 | |
| 7.1.1 | 0 / 14 | |
| 4.6.0 | 0 / 16 |
v8.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.