@sap-ux/create
SAP Fiori tools module to add or remove features
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large SAP open-source monorepo; provenance not currently enabled; stable pattern across all versions. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): SAP org migrated publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; stable transition for this monorepo package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): dotenv and @sap-ux/store are legitimate packages consistent with SAP tooling scope. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sap/cf-tools | AI (phantom-deps): SAP org package; referenced in config files, not direct import. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sap-ux/btp-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same SAP org scope; phantom-dep heuristic fires on indirect usage patterns common in this monorepo. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sap-ux/nodejs-utils | AI (phantom-deps): Same SAP org scope; stable false positive for this monorepo package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 367)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.22 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.21 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.20 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.19 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.18 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.17 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.16 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.15 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.14 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.13 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.12 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.11 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.10 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.9 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.7 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.6 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.5 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.4 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.2 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.1 | 25 / 8 | |
| 1.0.0 | 25 / 8 | |
| 0.17.6 | 25 / 7 | |
| 0.17.5 | 25 / 7 | |
| 0.17.4 | 25 / 7 | |
| 0.17.2 | 25 / 7 | |
| 0.17.1 | 25 / 7 | |
| 0.17.0 | 25 / 7 | |
| 0.16.8 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.16.7 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.16.5 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.16.4 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.16.3 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.96 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.95 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.94 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.93 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.92 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.91 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.90 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.89 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.88 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.86 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.85 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.84 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.83 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.82 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.81 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.80 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.79 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.78 | 23 / 7 | |
| 0.15.77 | 23 / 7 |
v1.0.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.96
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.95
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.94
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.93
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.92
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.91
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.90
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.89
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.88
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.86
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.85
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.84
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.82
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.81
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.80
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.79
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.78
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.77
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.