@rushstack/eslint-plugin-security
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Microsoft/RushStack monorepo package; provenance absence is consistent across all their releases. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@rushstack/tree-pattern | AI (dependencies): Same org/publisher (@rushstack); trusted internal dependency used across the RushStack ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.14.2 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.14.1 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.14.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.13.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.12.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 0.11.0 | 2 / 7 |
v0.14.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.13.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.