@rushstack/eslint-plugin-packlets
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@rushstack/tree-pattern | AI (phantom-deps): Declared as a runtime dependency in package.json; same org scope, not a phantom dep. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.15.2 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.15.1 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.15.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.14.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.13.0 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.12.0 | 2 / 5 |
v0.15.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.