@rspack/binding-win32-x64-msvc
Node binding for rspack
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher (hardfist) to GitHub Actions reflects legitimate CI/CD automation, confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation. This pattern is stable for rspack binding packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific native binding package for rspack. Minimal README, no deps, and tiny payload are all expected characteristics of this package type. SLSA provenance confirms legitimate CI/CD publishing. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 190)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.3.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.3.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.3.13 | 0 / 0 |
v2.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.3
2 findingsMatched 5 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_README_LINKDUMP] README is a link dump (5 URLs) that barely mentions the package — typical of phishing link farms. • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 0 code file(s), 2077 bytes total.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.2
2 findingsMatched 5 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_README_LINKDUMP] README is a link dump (5 URLs) that barely mentions the package — typical of phishing link farms. • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 0 code file(s), 2077 bytes total.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.1
2 findingsMatched 5 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_README_LINKDUMP] README is a link dump (5 URLs) that barely mentions the package — typical of phishing link farms. • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 0 code file(s), 2077 bytes total.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
2 findingsMatched 5 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_README_LINKDUMP] README is a link dump (5 URLs) that barely mentions the package — typical of phishing link farms. • [S_README_NO_CODE] Short README with no code block, no install instructions, and no usage/API section. • [S_NO_KEYWORDS] No keywords declared. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 0 code file(s), 2077 bytes total.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.