@rsdoctor/utils
This package is the Rsdoctor's tools package.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package publishes via GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; this is the expected CI/CD pattern for this monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI-attested publish from established org repo; not indicative of takeover. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package is published via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA provenance; publisher-changed to GHA is expected for this org. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:etc-passwd-access | AI (semgrep): Hit is inside a comment in bundled connect source; no actual /etc/passwd access occurs. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-bulk-read | AI (semgrep): Standard debug module pattern filtering process.env keys by prefix; not credential harvesting. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/estree | AI (phantom-deps): @types/estree is a type-only package used by TypeScript tooling; not directly imported at runtime. | ai |
Versions (showing 47 of 47)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.12 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.11 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.10 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.9 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.8 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.7 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.6 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.5 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.4 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.3 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.2 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.1 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.5.0 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.4.0 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.16 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.15 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.14 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.13 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.12 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.11 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.10 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.9 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.8 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.7 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.6 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.5 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.4 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.3 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.2 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.1 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.3.0 | 15 / 11 | |
| 1.2.3 | 17 / 9 | |
| 1.2.2 | 17 / 9 | |
| 1.2.1 | 17 / 9 | |
| 1.2.0 | 17 / 9 | |
| 1.1.11 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.10 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.9 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.8 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.7 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.6 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.5 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.4 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.3 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.2 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.1 | 17 / 8 | |
| 1.1.0 | 17 / 8 |
v1.5.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.11
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.10
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.9
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.8
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.7
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.6
2 findingsAccessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.5
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.4
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.3
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.16
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.15
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.14
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.13
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.12
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.11
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.10
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.9
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.8
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.7
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.6
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.5
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.4
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.3
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 912 | // stream from an existing fd which is writable only. But for now 913 | // we'll just add this hack and set the `readable` member to false. > 914 | // Test: ./node test/fixtures/echo.js < /etc/passwd 915 | stream.readable = false; 916 | stream.read = null;
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.