@rsbuild/webpack
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/0.cjs | AI (source-diff): Minified webpack chunk bundle containing known npm packages; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/0.js | AI (source-diff): Minified webpack chunk bundle containing known npm packages; not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is backed by SLSA provenance attestation; expected for CI/CD-automated publishing. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/0~0.js | AI (source-diff): Same webpack bundle pattern as dist/1~0.cjs; legitimate build artifact. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/1~0.cjs | AI (source-diff): Webpack-bundled chunk of known devDependencies (ansi-escapes etc.); minified but not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/0~999.js | AI (source-diff): dist/ contains webpack-bundled output from rslib build; long lines are minified but readable module code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Active monorepo package with 255 versions; dormancy signal is a false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.6.2 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.6.1 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.6.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.4.3 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.4.2 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.4.1 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.4.0 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.3.4 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.3.3 | 7 / 8 | |
| 1.3.2 | 7 / 8 |
v1.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.3
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.2
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.