@react-spring/web
`react-dom` support
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; legitimate transition for pmndrs org. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Expected when switching to GitHub Actions publish flow; SLSA provenance compensates. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy consistent with major version prep; established package with strong ecosystem trust. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): High-trust established package; provenance absence is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.1.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 10.0.4 | 5 / 0 | |
| 10.0.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 10.0.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 10.0.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 10.0.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 9.7.5 | 4 / 0 |
v10.1.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.7.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.