@react-email/tailwind
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): dist/index.cjs is a standard rolldown bundle; the sample shows only CommonJS runtime boilerplate, not malicious network+exec. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from bukinoshita to GitHub Actions CI/CD is consistent with the resend/react-email repo automating npm publishes with SLSA attestation. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI/CD-attested publish from the official repo is consistent with a legitimate release cadence change, not a takeover. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.7 | 1 / 25 | |
| 2.0.6 | 1 / 25 | |
| 2.0.5 | 1 / 25 | |
| 2.0.4 | 1 / 25 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 18 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 19 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 19 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 19 |
v2.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.6
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.