@radix-ui/react-visually-hidden
View docs [here](https://radix-ui.com/primitives/docs/utilities/visually-hidden).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI component packages have minimal READMEs and no keywords by convention. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): vladmoroz is a known Radix UI team member with extensive publish history; transition from benoitgrelard is a legitimate internal handoff within the same org. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established Radix UI package; missing description is a cosmetic issue, not a malware indicator for this well-known package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Radix UI packages historically published without Sigstore provenance; absence is not a risk signal for this established package. | ai |
Versions (showing 29 of 29)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.4 | 1 / 9 | |
| 1.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.15 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.14 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.13 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.12 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.11 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.10 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.9 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.8 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.7 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 1 |
v1.2.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-09-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.15
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-08-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.10
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.