@radix-ui/react-use-size
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): jjenzz and benoitgrelard are both Radix UI core contributors; the 2022 team transition is well-documented and consistent across the entire @radix-ui namespace. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): @babel/runtime is a standard build-time transpilation artifact used across all @radix-ui packages; loaded by convention, not a suspicious import. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @radix-ui/react-use-layout-effect is a first-party Radix UI package; adding it is an internal refactor, not a supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): vladmoroz is a known Radix UI core maintainer; publisher transitions within the Radix UI team are routine and not indicative of compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Radix UI primitives do not currently publish Sigstore provenance; absence is consistent across the entire package family and not a risk indicator. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI sub-packages structurally omit descriptions and keywords; spam-publisher flag covers the entire Radix UI team and is a false positive for this well-established library. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Radix UI primitive sub-packages consistently omit descriptions; this is a monorepo convention, not a malicious signal. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 9 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 1 |
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.