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@radix-ui/react-use-layout-effect

npm Repository Homepage
10
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

benoitgrelardstephenhaneyandy-hookhadihallakchancestricklandmark-workos

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): vladmoroz is a known Radix UI team member; publisher transitions within the Radix UI org are routine and not indicative of compromise. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Radix UI sub-packages consistently lack descriptions/keywords by design; spam-flagged maintainers are the Radix UI core team, a known false positive for this monorepo. ai
npm-metadata no-description AI (npm-metadata): Radix UI utility hook sub-packages intentionally omit descriptions; consistent across all versions of this package. ai

Versions (showing 10 of 10)

Version Deps Published
1.1.1 0 / 8
1.1.0 0 / 0
1.0.1 1 / 0
1.0.0 1 / 0
0.1.0 1 / 0
0.0.5 1 / 0
0.0.4 1 / 0
0.0.3 1 / 0
0.0.2 1 / 0
0.0.1 0 / 0

v1.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: benoitgrelard → vladmoroz (on 2024-06-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.1.0

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: jjenzz → benoitgrelard (on 2021-09-07) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-09-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v0.0.5

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: jjenzz → benoitgrelard (on 2021-03-26) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v0.0.4

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: benoitgrelard → jjenzz (on 2021-03-24) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

v0.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.