@radix-ui/react-primitive
This is an internal utility, not intended for public usage.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): benoitgrelard is a known Radix UI core contributor; the transition from jjenzz is a legitimate internal team handoff within the radix-ui org, not a takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of jjenzz reflects the same legitimate Radix UI team transition; benoitgrelard is a well-established publisher with 554 approved packages. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped monorepo packages in @radix-ui commonly omit descriptions; not a meaningful risk signal for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI packages intentionally have minimal READMEs and no keywords in their scoped packages. S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER is a false positive for the legitimate Radix UI/WorkOS team. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Radix UI monorepo tooling change explains missing gitHead; no security implication for this established package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Radix UI package; lack of Sigstore provenance is a process gap, not a security risk for this well-known library. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.4 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.3 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.2 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 8 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 8 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.15 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.12 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.10 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 0 |
v2.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.