@radix-ui/react-polymorphic
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Both andy-hook and benoitgrelard are known Radix UI team members; this is a legitimate internal maintainer transition within the radix-ui org. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI is a well-established component library; spam-flagged maintainers are false positives, and the near-empty dist is expected for a types-only polymorphic helper package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Established Radix UI package with 54k weekly downloads; missing description is a cosmetic issue, not a malicious indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates widespread Sigstore provenance adoption; no provenance is expected for packages published in this era. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.14 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.13 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.12 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.11 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.10 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.9 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.8 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 1 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 2 |
v0.0.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-09-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-08-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.9
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.