@radix-ui/react-context
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Radix UI monorepo sub-package; short README and no keywords are normal for scoped internal packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package that predates Sigstore adoption; no provenance is expected for this publisher's workflow. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): benoitgrelard is a core Radix UI maintainer; transition from jjenzz is a legitimate team change within the same org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Radix UI team restructuring; removed maintainers were previous team members, not a takeover. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Minor metadata omission; stable for this well-established scoped package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): @babel/runtime is injected by Babel transform-runtime plugin; standard pattern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.3 | 0 / 9 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 8 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.4
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.