@radix-ui/number
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from benoitgrelard to jjenzz reflects a legitimate maintainer rotation within the Radix UI core team; both are known contributors to radix-ui/primitives. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): @radix-ui/number is a legitimate internal utility package in the Radix UI primitives monorepo. Missing description/keywords are consistent across the entire @radix-ui/* namespace. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Absence of description is a consistent pattern across @radix-ui/* utility packages; not an indicator of malicious intent. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): @babel/runtime is a standard build-time dependency used across the Radix UI monorepo; phantom detection is a false positive here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): This version predates Sigstore provenance adoption (published 2021); lack of provenance is expected for packages of this age. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v1.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-06-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.