@radix-effects/tx-tool
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radixdlt/radix-engine-toolkit | AI (dependencies): Official Radix DLT SDK; legitimate ecosystem dependency for a Radix blockchain tooling package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-effects/shared | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo dependency from same author/org; consistent across versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@steleaio/radix-engine-toolkit | AI (dependencies): Same author's scoped package; no malicious indicators found. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): New monorepo package; missing description is cosmetic, not a malware signal. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@radixdlt/babylon-core-api-sdk | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in dependencies; likely re-exported or used indirectly via bundled output. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance; absence alone is not a risk signal for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bignumber.js | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in dependencies; likely re-exported or used indirectly via bundled output. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.1 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.1.0 | 9 / 3 | |
| 0.0.6 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 11 / 3 | |
| 0.0.1 | 11 / 3 |
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.