@propellerads/smart-hint
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@propellerads/button | AI (dependencies): Internal sibling package from same @propellerads org; consistent with a UI component library pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established org package; no provenance is consistent across their published components. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.0.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 2.0.1 | 3 / 3 |
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.