@pnpm/worker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/crypto.integrity | AI (dependencies): Same-org pnpm internal package; consistent with the rest of the dependency tree. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Expected in a pnpm worker package that manages tarball extraction and build processes. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Used for integrity hash normalization/verification, not payload obfuscation. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): Used for integrity hash comparison in tarball verification logic, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/fs.graceful-fs | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org pnpm package; declared as dependency, likely re-exported or used indirectly within the monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 29 of 29)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1100.1.11 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.10 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.9 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.8 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.7 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.6 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.5 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.4 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.3 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.2 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.1 | 14 / 6 | |
| 1100.1.0 | 14 / 5 | |
| 1100.0.2 | 14 / 5 | |
| 1100.0.1 | 14 / 5 | |
| 1100.0.0 | 14 / 5 | |
| 1000.6.7 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.6.6 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.6.5 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.6.4 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.6.3 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.6.2 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.6.1 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.6.0 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.5.0 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.4.1 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.4.0 | 13 / 4 | |
| 1000.3.3 | 14 / 4 | |
| 1000.3.2 | 14 / 4 | |
| 1000.3.1 | 14 / 4 |
v1100.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.6.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.6.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.6.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zkochan) than the most recent previously approved version (pnpmuser) on 2026-02-17, but zkochan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1000.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.