@pnpm/store.cafs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): pnpmuser is the established pnpm org publishing account with 100 approved packages; transition from zkochan is a known organizational publishing pattern for pnpm monorepo packages. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy explained by pnpm major version release cycle (v10→v11). SLSA provenance attestation mitigates account takeover risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/fetching.fetcher-base | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org @pnpm/* scoped package; likely used as type-only import or re-export. Not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/store.controller-types | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org @pnpm/* scoped package; likely used as type-only import or re-export. Not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/store-controller-types | AI (phantom-deps): Internal @pnpm monorepo dependency declared for type/tooling use; phantom dep pattern is expected in this monorepo structure. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:p-limit | AI (phantom-deps): p-limit is a declared runtime dependency; phantom detection likely a false positive from indirect usage patterns in this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/fetcher-base | AI (phantom-deps): Internal @pnpm monorepo dependency declared for type/tooling use; phantom dep pattern is expected in this monorepo structure. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1100.1.7 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1100.1.6 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1100.1.5 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1100.1.4 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1100.1.3 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1100.1.2 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1100.1.1 | 12 / 9 | |
| 1100.1.0 | 12 / 8 | |
| 1100.0.2 | 12 / 8 | |
| 1100.0.1 | 12 / 8 | |
| 1100.0.0 | 12 / 8 | |
| 1000.1.4 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1000.1.3 | 10 / 9 | |
| 1000.1.2 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1000.1.1 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1000.1.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1000.0.24 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1000.0.23 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1000.0.22 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1000.0.21 | 9 / 9 | |
| 1000.0.20 | 9 / 9 |
v1100.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1100.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.0.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.