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@pnpm/modules-yaml

Reads/writes `node_modules/.modules.yaml`

8
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures No source commit

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

pnpmuserzkochan

Keywords

pnpmpnpm10modules.yaml

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): pnpm monorepo publishes via GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; this is the documented CI/CD transition, not a compromise. ai

Versions (showing 8 of 8)

Version Deps Published
1002.0.1 5 / 4
1002.0.0 5 / 4
1001.0.2 5 / 4
1001.0.1 5 / 4
1001.0.0 5 / 4
1000.3.8 5 / 4
1000.3.7 5 / 4
12.1.7 5 / 4

v1002.0.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pnpmuser → zkochan (on 2026-02-17) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1002.0.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pnpmuser → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1001.0.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pnpmuser → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1001.0.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pnpmuser → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1001.0.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pnpmuser → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-08) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1000.3.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pnpmuser → GitHub Actions (on 2025-11-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1000.3.7

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: pnpmuser → GitHub Actions (on 2025-11-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v12.1.7

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.