@pnpm/link-bins
Link bins to node_modules/.bin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@zkochan/cmd-shim | AI (dependencies): @zkochan/cmd-shim is a well-known Windows cmd shim utility authored by pnpm's lead maintainer; its use here is expected and legitimate. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/package-bins | AI (dependencies): Core pnpm monorepo package; its inclusion in @pnpm/link-bins is expected and consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/manifest-utils | AI (dependencies): Core pnpm monorepo package; its inclusion in @pnpm/link-bins is expected and consistent across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/read-project-manifest | AI (dependencies): Core pnpm monorepo package; its inclusion in @pnpm/link-bins is expected and consistent across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1000.3.8 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.7 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.6 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.5 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.4 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.3 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.2 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.1 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.3.0 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.2.6 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.2.5 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.2.4 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.2.3 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.2.2 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.2.1 | 17 / 11 | |
| 1000.2.0 | 18 / 10 | |
| 1000.1.0 | 18 / 10 | |
| 1000.0.13 | 17 / 10 | |
| 1000.0.12 | 17 / 10 |
v1000.3.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (zkochan) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-02-17, but zkochan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1000.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1000.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.