@pnpm/fetch
node-fetch with retries
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established pnpm monorepo package with long history; lack of provenance is not a security concern here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1001.0.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.2.11 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.2.10 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.2.9 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.2.8 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.2.7 | 6 / 4 |
v1001.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.2.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.2.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.