@pnpm/directory-fetcher
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): zkochan is the original creator of pnpm; the switch from pnpmuser (CI bot) back to zkochan is a legitimate maintainer transition, not a compromise. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy is from zkochan's account perspective only; pnpm project used pnpmuser for automated publishing. zkochan resuming direct publishing is expected for this ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): pnpm monorepo packages are published by the established pnpmuser publisher without Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across all their releases and not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@pnpm/resolver-base | AI (phantom-deps): @pnpm/resolver-base is declared in dependencies in package.json; phantom-dep finding is a false positive for this package's usage pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1000.1.25 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.24 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.23 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.22 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.21 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.20 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.19 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.18 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.17 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.16 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.15 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.14 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.13 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.12 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.11 | 6 / 5 | |
| 1000.1.10 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.1.9 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.1.8 | 6 / 4 | |
| 1000.1.7 | 6 / 4 |
v1000.1.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.1.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.1.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1000.1.14
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1000.1.13
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1000.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1000.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.