@pnpm/default-resolver
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): pnpm monorepo migrated to GitHub Actions publishing with SLSA provenance attestation; the publisher change is legitimate and expected to persist across future versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/npm-resolver | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/node.resolver | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/fetching-types | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/git-resolver | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/tarball-resolver | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/resolving.bun-resolver | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/resolving.deno-resolver | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@pnpm/local-resolver | AI (dependencies): Internal pnpm monorepo sibling package; published from the same repo with SLSA provenance. Unvetted status reflects review queue lag, not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 40 of 40)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1002.3.10 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.9 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.8 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.7 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.6 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.5 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.4 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.3 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.2 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.1 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.3.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.23 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.22 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.21 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.20 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.19 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.18 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.17 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.16 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.15 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.14 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.13 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.12 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.11 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.10 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.9 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.8 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.7 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.6 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.5 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.4 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.3 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.2 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.1 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.2.0 | 10 / 2 | |
| 1002.1.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 1002.1.1 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1002.1.0 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1002.0.2 | 7 / 2 | |
| 1002.0.1 | 7 / 2 |
v1002.3.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.22
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.21
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.20
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.19
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.2.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1002.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1002.2.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.2.10
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1002.2.9
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1002.2.8
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1002.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.2.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1002.2.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1002.2.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1002.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1002.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1002.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.