@pnpm/config
Gets configuration options for pnpm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): pnpm project migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing; SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate pipeline. Publisher change is expected and documented for this monorepo. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): This sub-package of the pnpm monorepo may have infrequent independent publishes; the broader pnpm project is actively maintained. SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): pnpm monorepo packages are published by the trusted zkochan maintainer without Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across all versions and not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:is-subdir | AI (phantom-deps): is-subdir is a declared dependency in package.json; phantom-dep flag is a packaging artifact, not a security concern for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 27 of 27)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1004.11.2 | 28 / 9 | |
| 1004.11.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.11.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.10.4 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.10.3 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.10.2 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.10.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.10.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.9.2 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.9.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.9.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.8.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.8.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.7.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.6.2 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.6.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.6.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.5.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.4.2 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.4.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.4.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.3.1 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.3.0 | 27 / 9 | |
| 1004.2.1 | 27 / 8 | |
| 1004.2.0 | 27 / 8 | |
| 1004.1.0 | 27 / 8 | |
| 1004.0.0 | 27 / 8 |
v1004.11.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.10.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.10.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.10.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1004.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1004.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1004.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1004.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1004.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1004.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1004.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1004.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1004.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1004.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.