@pkgr/utils
Shared utils for `@pkgr` packages or any package else
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions as part of a legitimate CI/CD migration; SLSA provenance attestation confirms the build pipeline integrity for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal is consistent with the CI/CD migration; JounQin (i1stg) remains the author and the package is published via verified GitHub Actions pipeline. | ai |
Versions (showing 48 of 48)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 3.0.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 2.4.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.4.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.3.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.0.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.0.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.9 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.8 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.7 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 0 |
v4.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.