@pipeline-builder/pipeline-data
Database layer for Pipeline Builder: Drizzle ORM schemas, connection management, query builders, and the generic CrudService base class with multi-tenant access control.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/database/tenancy.js | AI (source-diff): File is readable compiled TypeScript with inline documentation; long lines are from comments/generated code, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/database/migrator.js | AI (source-diff): File is standard tsc-compiled TypeScript output; long lines are CommonJS boilerplate, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm packages lack it); this package has no other risk signals that would make provenance absence meaningful. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 114)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.2.5 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.2.4 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.2.3 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.2.2 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.2.1 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.2.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.1.5 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.1.4 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.1.3 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.1.2 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.1.1 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.1.0 | 3 / 14 |
v3.2.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.