@percy/cli-doctor
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Percy CLI monorepo; no provenance is consistent across all their packages and publisher is well-established. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.31.14 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.31.13 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.31.12 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.31.11 | 9 / 0 | |
| 1.31.10 | 9 / 0 |
v1.31.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.31.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.31.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.31.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.31.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.