@parity/schnorrkel-js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:schnorrkel_js_bg.js | AI (source-diff): The encoded string is a base64-encoded WASM binary (AGFzbQ = \0asm magic bytes) generated by wasm-bindgen. This is the expected and legitimate pattern for this WASM crypto library package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Standard wasm-bindgen glue code pattern; input comes from WASM memory controlled by compiled Rust, not external user input. Not exploitable in this context. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Standard wasm-bindgen glue code pattern for Node.js WASM bindings; module name comes from WASM memory, not external input. Expected artifact of wasm-bindgen toolchain. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package predates Sigstore provenance on npm by years; absence is expected and not a risk signal for this established Parity Technologies package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.4
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.