@parcel/watcher-linux-arm-glibc
A native C++ Node module for querying and subscribing to filesystem events. Used by Parcel 2.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary sub-packages for native addons intentionally have no deps, no keywords, minimal README, and start at the parent package's semver. All signals are expected false positives for this package type. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): watcher.node is the expected prebuilt native addon binary for @parcel/watcher, published by the official Parcel maintainer devongovett from the parcel-bundler org. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established publisher devongovett with strong track record; lack of provenance is not a disqualifying signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.5.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.2.0 | 0 / 0 |
v2.5.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • watcher.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • watcher.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • watcher.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.