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@parcel/watcher-linux-arm-glibc

A native C++ Node module for querying and subscribing to filesystem events. Used by Parcel 2.

8
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

devongovett

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary sub-packages for native addons intentionally have no deps, no keywords, minimal README, and start at the parent package's semver. All signals are expected false positives for this package type. ai
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): watcher.node is the expected prebuilt native addon binary for @parcel/watcher, published by the official Parcel maintainer devongovett from the parcel-bundler org. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Established publisher devongovett with strong track record; lack of provenance is not a disqualifying signal here. ai

Versions (showing 8 of 8)

Version Deps Published
2.5.6 0 / 0
2.5.4 0 / 0
2.5.1 0 / 0
2.5.0 0 / 0
2.4.1 0 / 0
2.4.0 0 / 0
2.3.0 0 / 0
2.2.0 0 / 0

v2.5.6

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • watcher.node

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.5.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.4.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.4.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.3.0

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • watcher.node

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • watcher.node

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.