@opentelemetry/exporter-metrics-otlp-grpc
OpenTelemetry Collector Metrics Exporter allows user to send collected metrics to the OpenTelemetry Collector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics-base | AI (dependencies): Same-org sibling package from the official opentelemetry-js monorepo; no real risk, expected dependency for this metrics exporter. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): This is a 2021-era release from the official OpenTelemetry JS monorepo; Sigstore provenance was not standard practice at this version's publish time. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@grpc/proto-loader | AI (phantom-deps): @grpc/proto-loader is a declared runtime dependency used for proto loading configuration; the phantom-dep finding reflects indirect usage patterns typical for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/otlp-grpc-exporter-base | AI (dependencies): Internal @opentelemetry org dependency; same project ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/exporter-metrics-otlp-http | AI (dependencies): Internal @opentelemetry org dependency; same project ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/core | AI (dependencies): Internal @opentelemetry org dependency; same project ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/resources | AI (dependencies): Internal @opentelemetry org dependency; same project ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics | AI (dependencies): Internal @opentelemetry org dependency; same project ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/otlp-transformer | AI (dependencies): Internal @opentelemetry org dependency; same project ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/otlp-exporter-base | AI (dependencies): Internal @opentelemetry org dependency; same project ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from individual maintainer to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation is a security improvement for this established OpenTelemetry monorepo package. Generalizes to future versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/otlp-exporter-base | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org dependency; phantom dep pattern is expected for @opentelemetry packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@grpc/grpc-js | AI (phantom-deps): gRPC exporter legitimately uses gRPC; phantom dep is expected for this package type. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/resources | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org dependency; phantom dep pattern is expected for @opentelemetry packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/sdk-metrics | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org dependency; phantom dep pattern is expected for @opentelemetry packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/core | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org dependency; phantom dep pattern is expected for @opentelemetry packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 66)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.218.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.217.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.216.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.215.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.214.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.213.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.212.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.211.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.210.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.209.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.208.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.207.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.206.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 0.205.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 0.204.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 0.203.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.202.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.201.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.201.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.200.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.57.2 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.57.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.57.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.56.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.55.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.54.2 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.54.1 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.54.0 | 8 / 12 | |
| 0.53.0 | 8 / 13 | |
| 0.52.1 | 8 / 14 | |
| 0.52.0 | 8 / 14 | |
| 0.51.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 0.51.0 | 7 / 15 | |
| 0.50.0 | 7 / 15 | |
| 0.49.1 | 7 / 15 | |
| 0.49.0 | 7 / 15 | |
| 0.48.0 | 7 / 15 | |
| 0.47.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.46.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.45.1 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.45.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.44.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.43.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.42.0 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.41.2 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.41.1 | 7 / 16 | |
| 0.41.0 | 8 / 16 | |
| 0.40.0 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.39.1 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.39.0 | 7 / 14 | |
| 0.38.0 | 7 / 15 |
v0.218.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.217.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.216.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.214.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.213.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.212.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.211.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.210.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.209.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.208.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.207.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.206.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.205.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.204.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.203.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.202.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.201.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.201.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.200.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.57.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.57.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.57.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.56.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.55.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.54.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.54.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.54.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.53.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.52.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.52.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.51.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.51.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.50.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.49.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.49.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.48.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.47.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.46.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.45.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.45.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.44.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.43.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.42.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-07-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.41.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.40.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.39.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.39.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.38.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.