@opentelemetry/exporter-logs-otlp-grpc
OpenTelemetry Collector Exporter allows user to send collected log records to the OpenTelemetry Collector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/otlp-grpc-exporter-base | AI (dependencies): Co-released sibling package from the same open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/otlp-transformer | AI (dependencies): Co-released sibling package from the same open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/core | AI (dependencies): Co-released sibling package from the same open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/sdk-logs | AI (dependencies): Co-released sibling package from the same open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@opentelemetry/otlp-exporter-base | AI (dependencies): Co-released sibling package from the same open-telemetry/opentelemetry-js monorepo; unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): OpenTelemetry JS project migrated to GitHub Actions automated publishing with SLSA provenance; publisher change from individual maintainer to GitHub Actions is expected and documented for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer removal is consistent with OpenTelemetry JS project's transition to automated CI/CD publishing; not indicative of a takeover. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@grpc/grpc-js | AI (phantom-deps): @grpc/grpc-js is a declared runtime dependency of this gRPC exporter package; phantom detection is a false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@opentelemetry/core | AI (phantom-deps): @opentelemetry/core is a same-org sibling dependency; phantom detection is a false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 50 of 50)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.218.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.217.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.216.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.215.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.214.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.213.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.212.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.211.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.210.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.209.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.208.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.207.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.206.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 0.205.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 0.204.0 | 6 / 13 | |
| 0.203.0 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.202.0 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.201.1 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.201.0 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.200.0 | 6 / 14 | |
| 0.57.2 | 6 / 15 | |
| 0.57.1 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.57.0 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.56.0 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.55.0 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.54.2 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.54.1 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.54.0 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.53.0 | 5 / 16 | |
| 0.52.1 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.52.0 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.51.1 | 5 / 18 | |
| 0.51.0 | 5 / 18 | |
| 0.50.0 | 5 / 18 | |
| 0.49.1 | 5 / 18 | |
| 0.49.0 | 5 / 18 | |
| 0.48.0 | 5 / 18 | |
| 0.47.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.46.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.45.1 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.45.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.44.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.43.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.42.0 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.41.2 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.41.1 | 5 / 19 | |
| 0.41.0 | 6 / 19 | |
| 0.40.0 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.39.1 | 5 / 17 | |
| 0.39.0 | 5 / 17 |
v0.218.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.217.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.216.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.214.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.213.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.212.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.211.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.210.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.209.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.208.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.207.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.206.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.205.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.204.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.203.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.202.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.201.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.201.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.200.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.57.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.57.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.57.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.56.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.55.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.54.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.54.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.54.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.53.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.52.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.52.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.51.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.51.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.50.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.49.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.49.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.48.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.47.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.46.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.45.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.45.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.44.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.43.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.42.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.41.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-07-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.41.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.40.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.39.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.