@openmrs/webpack-config
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Reads consumer's package.json via resolve(cwd, 'package.json'); benign build-tool pattern stable across versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@swc/core | AI (phantom-deps): Used indirectly via swc-loader; not directly imported but legitimately declared as a runtime dep. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:webpack-cli | AI (phantom-deps): CLI tool used at build time; not directly imported in source but a legitimate declared dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.0.0 | 14 / 2 | |
| 9.0.2 | 14 / 2 | |
| 9.0.1 | 14 / 2 | |
| 9.0.0 | 14 / 2 |
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v9.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.