@npmcli/run-script
Run a lifecycle script for a package (descendant of npm-lifecycle)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): node-gyp is a core npm ecosystem tool; its addition to @npmcli/run-script is expected given the package's purpose of running lifecycle scripts including native build steps. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): This is the npm org's own package; the maintainer change reflects a legitimate organizational account restructuring (individual devs → npm-cli-ops org account), not a hijack. SLSA provenance confirms CI/CD publishing. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Package is owned by GitHub Inc. (npm org); maintainer rotations within the npm CLI team are routine and expected. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions CI/CD for this official GitHub/npm org package. SLSA provenance attestation confirms integrity. This is expected for @npmcli packages migrating to automated publishing. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Package is owned by GitHub Inc. (npm org); maintainer rotations within the npm CLI team are routine and expected. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): This package is a lifecycle script runner; spawning child processes is its core purpose. This finding is a stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Spreading process.env is intentional — this package runs lifecycle scripts in child processes that must inherit the parent environment. This is core functionality, not a vulnerability. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:which | AI (phantom-deps): 'which' is explicitly declared as a runtime dependency in package.json; the phantom-dep finding is a false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 63)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.0.3 | 6 / 4 | |
| 10.0.2 | 6 / 4 | |
| 10.0.1 | 6 / 4 | |
| 10.0.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 9.1.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 9.0.2 | 6 / 4 | |
| 9.0.1 | 6 / 4 | |
| 9.0.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 8.1.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 8.0.0 | 6 / 4 | |
| 7.0.4 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.3 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 7.0.0 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.0.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.0.1 | 5 / 4 | |
| 6.0.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 5.1.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 5.1.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 5.0.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 5.0.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 4.2.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 4.2.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 4.1.7 | 5 / 5 | |
| 4.1.6 | 5 / 5 | |
| 4.1.5 | 5 / 5 | |
| 4.1.4 | 4 / 5 | |
| 4.1.3 | 4 / 5 | |
| 4.1.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 4.1.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 4.1.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 4.0.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 3.0.3 | 4 / 5 | |
| 3.0.2 | 4 / 5 | |
| 3.0.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 3.0.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 1.8.6 | 4 / 8 | |
| 1.8.5 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.8.4 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.8.3 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.8.2 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.8.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.8.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.7.5 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.7.4 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.7.3 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.7.2 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.7.1 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.7.0 | 5 / 3 |
v10.0.3
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/npm/run-script/blob/9c30731cd78df2cd1b40e6dcd2507c8ac2ddd8a5/lib/make-spawn-args.js#L32 30 | } 31 | > 32 | const spawnEnv = setPATH(path, binPaths, { 33 | // we need to at least save the PATH environment var 34 | ...process.env,
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.2
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/npm/run-script/blob/5f31cdaab33e4c4eabbcf40c5607691db7dffb95/lib/make-spawn-args.js#L32 30 | } 31 | > 32 | const spawnEnv = setPATH(path, binPaths, { 33 | // we need to at least save the PATH environment var 34 | ...process.env,
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v9.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v8.0.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (nlf, ruyadorno, darcyclarke, isaacs) were replaced by new maintainers (npm-cli-ops, saquibkhan, fritzy, gar, lukekarrys). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-04-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.4
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (nlf, ruyadorno, darcyclarke, isaacs) were replaced by new maintainers (npm-cli-ops, saquibkhan, fritzy, gar, lukekarrys). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.3
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (nlf, ruyadorno, darcyclarke, isaacs) were replaced by new maintainers (npm-cli-ops, saquibkhan, fritzy, gar, lukekarrys). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-01-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.2
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (nlf, ruyadorno, darcyclarke, isaacs) were replaced by new maintainers (npm-cli-ops, saquibkhan, fritzy, gar, lukekarrys). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.1
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (nlf, ruyadorno, darcyclarke, isaacs) were replaced by new maintainers (npm-cli-ops, saquibkhan, fritzy, gar, lukekarrys). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-08-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (nlf, ruyadorno, darcyclarke, isaacs) were replaced by new maintainers (npm-cli-ops, saquibkhan, fritzy, gar, lukekarrys). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-08-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-05-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-11-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-11-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-11-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-10-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-06-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-04-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-09-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-08-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-02-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2021-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-11-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.