@npmcli/move-file
move a file (fork of move-file)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): lukekarrys is a known npm CLI team member; the transition from gar to lukekarrys is a documented legitimate maintainer change within the npm/GitHub org. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 2 |
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-10-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-04-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.