@node-minify/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publishing is consistent with CI automation by the original repo owner (srod/node-minify); SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI-automated publish with SLSA provenance; consistent with a maintainer resuming development via automation. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Legitimate scoped package in the node-minify monorepo; name similarity to 'cors' is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.5.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 10.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 10.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 10.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 10.1.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 10.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 10.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 10.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 10.0.0 | 2 / 1 |
v10.5.0
2 findingsPackage name '@node-minify/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v10.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.