@ng-icons/lucide
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:types/ng-icons-lucide.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long lines are SVG markup in TypeScript declare const statements — expected output for a large icon library's type definitions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known Angular/TypeScript implicit runtime dependency; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.2.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 32.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 32.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 32.3.0 | 1 / 0 |
v33.2.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.2.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.2.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.1.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v33.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.0.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.