@netflix/nerror
Rich errors
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change (hekike → donutespresso) occurred in 2019 within the Netflix org. Both are Netflix employees; this is a legitimate internal maintainer transition for a Netflix-scoped package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): mmarchini is a known Netflix engineer; addition is consistent with legitimate Netflix org team management for this Netflix-scoped package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.3 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 12 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 11 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 11 |
v1.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-07-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.