@napi-rs/triples
Rust target triples objects
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:./index.js | AI (source-diff): index.js is a minified but fully readable data file mapping platform/arch to Rust target triples. No obfuscation, no executable payload — this pattern is stable for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): forehalo is a known napi-rs contributor; SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD publish. Maintainer addition is a legitimate project team expansion. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): napi-rs/triples migrated from manual publishing (broooooklyn) to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation. This is a legitimate and documented security improvement for this well-established package. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation is a positive signal confirming CI/CD publishing integrity for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 49 of 49)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.10 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.9 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.8 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.7 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.6 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.5 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.4 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.3 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.2 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.1 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.0.9 | 0 / 4 | |
| 2.0.8 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.7 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.62 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.61 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.60 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.59 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.58 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.57 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.56 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.55 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.54 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.53 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.52 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.51 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.50 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.49 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.48 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.47 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.46 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.45 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.44 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.43 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.42 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0-alpha.41 | 0 / 5 |
v2.1.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.