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@napi-rs/snappy-android-arm64

Fastest Snappy compression library in Node.js

16
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

broooooklynforehalo

Keywords

snappysnapcompressioncompressnapi-rsNAPIN-APIRustNode-APInode-addonnode-addon-api

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation — this is the documented napi-rs CI/CD publishing pattern for the Brooooooklyn/snappy repo. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): Platform-specific binary packages in napi-rs ecosystem publish infrequently; dormancy is expected for Android ARM64 target packages. ai
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): This is a napi-rs platform-specific package; the .node binary is the expected and only artifact. SLSA provenance attestation confirms build integrity from the declared GitHub source. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific napi-rs sub-packages legitimately have no deps and minimal READMEs; they are not standalone packages and these signals are structural false positives. ai

Versions (showing 16 of 16)

Version Deps Published
7.3.3 0 / 0
7.3.2 0 / 0
7.3.1 0 / 0
7.3.0 0 / 0
7.2.2 0 / 0
7.2.1 0 / 0
7.2.0 0 / 0
7.1.2 0 / 0
7.1.1 0 / 0
7.1.0 0 / 0
7.0.5 0 / 0
7.0.4 0 / 0
7.0.3 0 / 0
7.0.2 0 / 0
7.0.1 0 / 0
7.0.0 0 / 0

v7.3.3

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • snappy.android-arm64.node

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v7.3.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: broooooklyn → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v7.3.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: broooooklyn → GitHub Actions (on 2025-08-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v7.3.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v7.2.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v7.2.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v7.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v7.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v7.1.1

2 findings
HIGH Bundled binary files (1) npm-metadata

Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • snappy.android-arm64.node

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v7.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v7.0.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v7.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v7.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v7.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v7.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v7.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.